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1. Introduction 
The OECD (1977) and Weidner (1989) have praised Japan for its rapid reduction of 
industrial pollution in the past. They noted that Japan’s success was attributable to a 
combination of direct administrative control, a technological approach, and initiatives by 
local governments. The Committee on Global Environment and Economy (1991) and the 
Committee on Japan’s Experience in the Battle against Air Pollution (1997) both pointed out 
that these measures and initiatives were a direct result of the growth of a fierce anti-pollution 
movement in Japan. This nationwide movement increased focus on environmental issues at 
elections and in environmental courts. Democratic and decentralized institutions enabled 
citizens and victims to exert political influence on local governments through elections and 
to bring cases to court, while civic rights and freedoms provided legal bases for organizing 
local protests and environmental movements against industrial pollution. 
However, the very success of this administrative and technological approach created a 
backlash in environmental policies. Despite taking advantage of the existing consensual 
relationships between government officials, business leaders, and the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), this approach was regarded as largely non-economic (OECD, 1977). In order 
to regain some of the economic growth lost to the recession, business leaders and the LDP 
tried to restrict the focus of any stringent environmental policies to a few pollutants and even 
to reverse existing policies. Central government officials had sufficient power and incentive 
to regain the initiative from local governments. Environmental concerns were themselves 
diluted due to the visible improvement of environmental pollution. This provided 
opportunities for the rolling back of stringent environmental policies. Institutions for 
accountable, transparent decision-making were also left unestablished, depriving citizens of 
both opportunities and resources to access environmental information and participate in 
environmental discourse. 
Recent local protests against public works, as well as the increasing global awareness of 
environmental impacts and environmental politics, may well provide the counteractive force 
needed to swing the pendulum back in favor of environmental pressure. There are indeed 
signs of the government being forced to set stringent environmental policies in some areas. 
However, Miyadai (2009: 25) argues that Japan has failed to change from its authoritarian 
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regime toward one that attaches importance to participatory, transparent, and pluralistic 
decision-making. This raises the question of whether Japan’s democratic and decentralized 
institutions can in fact render a sustainable solution to environmental problems, just as they 
once rendered a significant reduction in industrial pollution in Japan during the 1970s. 
In this chapter, we re-examine how democratic and decentralized institutions achieved 
success in industrial pollution control in Japan in the 1970s. We also examine how the 
government tamed environmental movements and local initiatives in the aftermath of that 
success. Then we look at the extent to which recent local protests against public works and 
the globalization of environmental issues have changed environmental governance under a 
neo-corporatist regime. 
 
2. Institutions for Democratic and Decentralized Management 
2.1 Democratization and Decentralization before World War II 
In the late nineteenth century, Japan replicated the parliamentary democracy that 
prevailed in Europe and the United States as a means of controlling the state under imperial 
rule. Citizens created strong movements for civic rights and freedoms in the 1880s. In 
response, the state decided to establish the National Diet in 1881 and held the first assembly 
in 1890. At first, voting rights were strictly limited to those taxpayers who paid higher 
amounts, most of whom were conservative supporters of the existing government. Later, 
such rights were gradually expanded to ordinary citizens, as the government broadly 
expanded the compulsory draft and tax base. 
Freedom of business was institutionally secured. In the process of modernization and 
industrialization, the central government made attempts to centralize authority and resources 
in order to develop stronger military forces and infrastructure for industrialization. It created 
a postal savings system in order to mobilize nationwide savings, which were small at the 
household level but collectively large. It enacted the Civil Law, to ensure property rights and 
enforcement of contracts and liabilities; the Commercial Law, to legally stipulate the rules 
of commercial transaction and the establishment and activities of corporations; and 
bankruptcy, as a means of removing consular jurisdiction. In this sense, the economic role 
of the government became immense, but was limited to protect, foster, and remedy private 
capital (Shibagaki, 1979). 
The government was created as an administratively centralized but fiscally decentralized 
system. The central government appointed prefectural governors and city mayors to control 
local governments; it transferred responsibility and imposed part of the fiscal burden of 
implementing central policies on local councils, even without their consent. This transfer of 
3 
 
  
responsibility forced increased implementation onto local governments and widened the 
range of their activities, thus enhancing their administrative capacity (Iio, 2007: 67). As an 
example, Osaka prefectural government enacted a local ordinance on the policing of 
industrial plants in 1877, giving itself the authority to revoke permission for companies to 
operate when it deemed them to be a “nuisance.”1 
Local governments also had authority to set the rate of local taxes. They did not obtain 
block grants or special subsidies from the central government (Jinno, 1999). This 
administrative and fiscal autonomy enabled several mayors to take the initiative in urban 
planning, health, and sanitation, as well as in the management of industrial pollution at a 
local level (Kuroda, 1997). Osaka and Tokyo municipalities both established local institutes 
of health and sanitation to conduct scientific research on the prevention of infectious disease. 
The knowledge base created from this helped municipalities to identify the epidemiological 
relationship between pollution levels and damage to health in the post-war period. 
However, the foundation of these liberal democratic rights was not strong enough, and 
hence was vulnerable to state intervention. The constitution recognized liberal democratic 
rights and human rights as special privileges that were not guaranteed at all times. In the 
wake of expanding voting rights to all males, in 1925 the government enacted the Internal 
Security Law, which strictly policed the Communist party and any social groups that plotted 
against the government or denied private property rights. With this law, the government 
began to oppress protests, conflicts, and movements that were identified as rebellions against 
the existing regime. 
This institutional arrangement made it difficult in general for people to access information 
on environmental issues, let alone to participate in or to receive justice regarding them. As 
industries caused serious pollution, anti-pollution protests were made against mining, 
refinery, and industrial plants. However, environmental issues were regarded as being of 
local and not general interest, even if a member of parliament appealed against serious 
damage caused by mining pollution in the National Parliament. To head off any protest, some 
polluters just relocated their plants or created abatement investments in the absence of any 
stringent government regulation (Tsuru, 1972). 
 
2.2 Repression of Democratic and Decentralized Management 
During World War II, state control was strengthened and expanded to all areas. The 
government deprived people of civic rights and freedoms, including free speech, free thought, 
                                                 
1 The effectiveness of this ordinance was nullified when the central government enacted 
the Factory Law in 1911 to protect industries from disputes (Tsuru, 1972). 
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and a free press. It tried to control economic activities and established special state 
corporations and state banks as tools for implementing state-intended policies (Noguchi, 
1995). Central intervention in local government affairs also increased. The central 
government introduced the income tax as a means of fiscal transfer so that local governments 
could keep the level of public services standardized across regions. It also forced local 
governments to adopt standard levels of tax, to prevent intraregional competition over 
service levels, and forced them to obtain central government consent for issuing bonds. 
These fiscal restrictions deprived local governments of autonomy and encouraged them to 
maximize special subsidies to finance new projects and activities (Jinno, 1999). 
After the war, the 1947 constitution provided a new constitutional basis for civil liberties 
and human rights. Article 25 states that all citizens shall have the right to maintain the 
minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living. Voting rights were expanded to all 
citizens above 20 years of age, and eligibility for election was expanded. The House of Peers 
was replaced by the House of Councilors, whose members were subject to general election. 
The Privy Council was abolished and the prime minister elected among the members of the 
House of Representatives. The constitution enshrines the right of access to justice. It also 
gives citizens participation rights, such as the right to directly elect provincial governors, 
mayors, and members of local councils, the right to dismiss these officials as well as major 
civil servants, and the right of peaceful petition for the enactment, repeal, or amendment of 
laws, ordinances, and regulations. 
Despite all these provisions, the constitution does not fully ensure accountability, 
transparency, or pluralistic decision-making. This is reflected by the lack of progress on 
freedom of information. The government carried over ideas from the former constitution that 
restricted citizens’ access to information (Matsui, 1996). Also, state corporations survived 
and complemented state activities, including public works under the national fiscal and loan 
program. 
 
2.3. Development Patterns in the Post-war Period 
In the post-war period, the central government adopted an economic development 
strategy that consisted of fostering specific industries and achieving balanced growth 
(Murakami, 1990). These two components were closely intertwined. Fostering specific 
industries widened the income gap and had potential to cause social instability, yet achieving 
balanced growth mitigated any grievances in the unselected sectors and created a middle 
class that consumed the products of the selected industries. Higher education and capable 
bureaucrats were preconditions for the effective implementation of this development strategy, 
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and achieving balanced growth fostered capable human capital for the bureaucracy as well 
as for private firms. 
During this time, the Japanese government mostly employed contest-based competition 
in fostering specific industries (World Bank, 1993). The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(MITI) identified long-term-cost-diminishing industries and permitted the allocation of 
scarce foreign exchange to the import of foreign technologies. It also prompted specific 
industries to merge their plants and to scrap small but superfluous capacity that caused 
“excessive” competition, in order to enhance competitiveness in the international market 
after trade liberalization. In the process, MITI established the Industrial Rationalization 
Council in 1949 to mediate—prior to any ministerial decision—between conflicting interests 
among the major stakeholders at issue, namely, the government, business, and trade unions. 
The Ministry of Finance employed economic instruments and gave administrative guidance 
to foster industries, including directed credit and tax privileges. State development banks 
chose projects mostly on economic criteria, employing rigorous credit evaluations to select 
among applicants, and the government selected sectors and firms for tax privileges in 
accordance with laws and regulations. 
Balanced growth was pursued to distribute the fruits of economic growth nationwide and 
to avoid the excess concentration of business in a limited number of cities (especially Tokyo). 
Several times, the central government made comprehensive development plans to attract 
industries to locate nationwide and to develop economic infrastructure nationwide. It 
designated several cities and areas as special promotion zones and offered tax privileges to 
promote investment there. In response, local governments in the designated areas competed 
to attract investment by developing land and economic infrastructure, and by offering tax 
privileges such as the exemption or reduction of corporate tax and property tax. They also 
competed for subsidies from the central government as a source of developing local 
economic infrastructure. The LDP pushed this regional redistribution strategy as a way to 
retain seats in the upper and lower houses. Together with mayors and prefectural governors, 
LDP members of parliament exercised their influence over ministries to increase subsidies 
to their jurisdictions. 
Balanced growth strategies helped develop electricity provision nationwide, a network of 
transportation, and wider diffusion of irrigated agriculture, all of which in turn helped to 
increase production capacity and productivity. However, this strategy did not always succeed 
in persuading industrial plants to locate in certain areas. Some local governments in remote 
areas have gained few plants even if they developed land and economic infrastructure in 
advance. Unregulated land speculation meant increased expenditure for purchasing land and 
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left them burdened with a huge amount of debt while generating little in the way of jobs and 
fiscal revenue, and often creating intense conflict within the local community. The typical 
case is Mutsu-Ogawara industrial complex that was expected to house petrochemical, iron 
and steel industries, and nuclear power plants (Funabashi, Hasegawa and Iijima, 1998). 
Even where local governments succeeded in inviting industrial plants, the local area often 
suffered from serious pollution. In many cases, despite prior concerns about adverse 
environmental impacts, local elites eventually accepted the location of large industrial plants 
and complexes in their area. Some prefectural governments made ordinances that required 
firms to report facilities that might have harmful effects on the environment, and made 
assessments and concluded voluntary agreements that required firms to control pollution. 
Others did nothing to prevent pollution. Residents were excluded from the decision-making 
process and thus had no way of knowing what had happened. 
A typical example of this was the petrochemical industrial complex in Yokkaichi. Local 
air and water became polluted soon after several industrial plants started operations in the 
1960s. They directly discharged heavily contaminated effluent to the nearby bay, which led 
to the massive death of fish and other aquatic life. Upon complaints from fishermen, the 
Coast Guard policed the effluent day and night, but this administrative guidance had a 
limited effect on reducing water pollution due to the lack of sufficient laws and regulations 
(the water pollution control law in effect at the time had a loose ambient standard). The 
extensive policing and on-site inspections of the Coast Guard encouraged some industrial 
plants to install wastewater treatment facilities, but because of the inaction of the MITI, other 
firms did nothing (Tajiri 1972). The industrial complexes also increased emissions of sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) and suspended particulate matter (SPM) as they expanded production. An 
increasing number of people suffered from asthma. Meanwhile, no government institutions 
were able to reduce emissions because of a lack of authority and resources for policing and 
inspecting the plants. 
In sum, governments paid too much attention to policies that aimed to foster specific 
industries and achieve balanced growth, and were unwilling to give sanctions and force 
pollution reduction at the cost of economic activities. 
 
3. Industrial Pollution Control 
3.1 Rising Environmental Movements 
The existence of democratic and decentralized institutions gave rise to anti-pollution 
movements in the 1960s. The newly created series of liberal democratic rights enabled 
victims to organize groups to protest against polluters and local governments without fear of 
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being arrested. The media picked up on serious pollution stories and reported them 
nationwide as they occurred at an increasing number of industrial complexes. Electoral 
democracy empowered people to exercise their influence by electing members of parliament, 
mayors, and local governors that had authority to commission plant location. Anti-pollution 
organizations gained an increasing number of seats in local parliaments and an increasing 
number of votes in mayoral and gubernatorial elections in many areas, as more people 
recognized environmental damage as a violation of human rights. They saw environmental 
protection as an issue of general interest with a moral basis, and as a result, industry 
enhanced collaboration with social movements that pursued the improvement of social 
welfare.2 
As a last resort, people brought cases to court and used such action as a tool to bond 
movements (Tsuru, 1972). Local courts generally judged in favor of victims in the pollution 
cases of the early 1970s. Defendant firms did not dare to appeal to higher courts, for they 
knew the judges in the Supreme Court would support the original decision (Yamamoto, 
1998). 
In the Yokkaichi air pollution case (the first court decision on a pollution case), the court 
found companies to have been negligent in locating and operating their plants. It detailed the 
following responsibilities to six firms in the petrochemical complex: strict liability for 
damages beyond “acceptable” emission levels; shift of the burden of proof to would-be 
environmental disrupters; and joint liability for outrage and negligence. It also detailed the 
responsibility of national and local governments in taking administrative measures for 
pollution control. 
In response, several local governments initiated research to investigate any causal 
relations between industrial plants, pollution and damage. However, they did little more than 
internal research and did not use the results to police the plants for another decade. Where 
industrial interests exerted significant influence, local governments discriminated against or 
completely ignored the complaints and opinions of victims. Most residents and victims knew 
little about government activities in dealing with pollution. They had to wait and suffer more 
serious pollution. Finally, with support from counselors and medical doctors, victims at last 
managed to bring cases against firms and governments. 
As victims won in other pollution cases, the Environmental Agency enacted strict liability 
into law. In 1974, it enacted the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation Law to 
                                                 
2 In Japan, most trade unions did not support environmental movements despite the 
common interest of improving the environment (Tsuru, 1972). This was partly attributed to 
the fact that trade unions were organized within firms instead of at an industrial level. 
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apply these responsibilities nationwide in aiding victims who suffered from severe pollution 
but could not afford the costs of bringing cases. Several polluted areas were designated as 
pollution control areas, and firms located within those areas were required to pay charges in 
accordance with the volume of their emissions, in order to finance compensation to victims 
who had lived there for a specified number of years. 
These court judgments and stringent regulations encouraged firms to be serious about 
emissions reduction, but made them anxious about the levels of reduction required. Even if 
a firm reduced emissions significantly, it still had to pay compensation as long as victims 
claimed damages (strict liability). The amount of compensation payable might also increase 
if another firm nearby continued to discharge emissions and caused further damage (joint 
liability). They called on the government to detail the levels of reduction required to avoid 
such an “excess” burden. 
 
3.2 Policy-making Process 
Citizens and victims, however, had no chance to participate in the decision-making and 
implementation process of industrial pollution control. It was the consensual relationships 
between government officials, business leaders, and the LDP that played an essential role in 
policy formulation. 
In response to strong anti-pollution movements, as mentioned, several local governments 
launched research to investigate any causal relations between industrial complexes and 
pollution. Osaka prefectural government, which suffered from serious air pollution, 
increased the number of staff and researchers to conduct simple monitoring at many sites to 
investigate the geographical distribution of pollution. It also obtained subsidies and technical 
assistance from MITI and the Ministry of Health and Welfare to make an energy use and 
emission inventory and to conduct health surveys investigating the epidemiological 
relationship between environmental quality and health damage (Mori, 1999). Institutes of 
health and sanitation at prefectural and municipal levels played a central role in health 
surveys by locality. This research established the relationship between emissions and 
damage, increased the scientific basis for total environmental load control and enabled 
governments to convince unwilling firms to comply with strict regulations. 
However, it was not until the central government enacted stringent environmental laws 
and regulations, and until the courts gave judgments in favor of victims, that local 
governments actually applied the findings of their emissions inventories and health surveys 
by enacting ordinances on ambient quality standards that were considered safe from a human 
health perspective, in areas where the central government had failed to act. They adopted 
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total pollutant load control and determined emission standards to attain ambient quality 
standards.3 They often concluded pollution control agreements with industry when issuing 
permits for installing new plants or expanding existing ones. Local people were sometimes 
involved in negotiating the content of pollution control agreements, but in most cases 
consultations and discussions occurred between local governments and business elites. 
At the national level, the central government employed the same institutions that had been 
established to foster specific industries in formulating and implementing environmental 
policies. In 1964, MITI restructured the Industrial Rationalization Council into the Industrial 
Structure Council to decide basic policy for industrial control. Members of the council 
usually consisted of experts such as ex-officials, professors, and representatives of 
influential groups such as business, trade unions, and, to a lesser extent, consumer groups. 
The appointment of council members enabled bureaucrats and political and business elites 
to direct discussions and to obtain the conclusions they were after. 4  Even when 
representatives of opponent groups were appointed as members, the council gave them little 
opportunity to express their opinions or to discuss issues seriously, due to reasons of time 
constraint. In addition, there was no steering committee to monitor implementation or to 
recommend modifications. There was no political space for citizens to become involved in 
the decision-making process, unless a majority of members of parliament reflected citizens’ 
opinions in parliamentary discussions. 
With this consensual relationship, many complementary measures were adopted to 
convince business elites to comply with stringent regulations. The central and local 
governments offered tax privileges such as special accelerated redemption and tax reduction 
or exemption of fixed assets to reduce firms’ investment costs. MITI set up environmental 
soft-loan programs to offer long-term loans at slightly lower interest rates, whenever new 
laws and regulations were enacted that required firms to invest in specific pollution-
abatement technologies, which often generated no profit. 5  The amount of outstanding 
                                                 
3 Yokkaichi municipality set a goal of ambient quality of 0.03ppm of SO2 and set a 
reduction target of 69% to attain this goal in 1972. Then it mandated a 20% reduction to 
the plants in the industrial complex under the pollution control plan that discharged 100m3 
per hour, and a 10% reduction to the plants that discharged 10–100m3 per hour. With more 
solid scientific knowledge, Osaka prefectural government set a goal of ambient quality of 
0.01ppm and set a reduction target at 85.6% for SO2, 76.3% for nitrogen oxides, and 
90.4% for SPM in its jurisdiction. Then it mandated a 38% reduction of SO2 for 20 large 
companies whose emissions exceeded 60%, and demanded the use of fossil fuel that 
contained less than 1.7% sulfur for other plants (Osaka Prefectural Government, 1974). 
4 Dryzek (2005: 166) describes Japan as “corporatism without labor.” 
5 An example is the soft-loan program for industrial waste-water treatment technologies 
that was set up two years after the Industrial Effluent Regulation Act had been enacted in 
10 
 
  
environmental soft loans exceeded JPY30 billion (US$90 million) in 1975, when many 
industrial plants and fossil-fuel-fired power plants invested in fuel-gas desulfurization 
(FGD). MITI defined technical standards and widely diffused them so that firms, local 
governments, and government banks in charge could share information on appropriate 
technologies and their costs. 
MITI also supported power generation companies to develop liquefied and storage 
technologies of national gas, assisted them to conclude long-term contracts on the import of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) with Indonesia, provided financial assistance to enhance 
capacity for desulfurization and convinced large plants to install FGD so that small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) could secure low-sulfur crude oil at an affordable price. 
 
3.3 Implementation at Street Level 
Local governments conducted strict monitoring and inspection to ensure compliance. 
They required large plants to install on-line continuous monitoring devices and to report 
monitoring data immediately. They also conducted frequent on-site inspections at those 
plants that had repeatedly violated standards or those that could not afford to finance 
continuous monitoring devices. They concluded pollution control agreements that included 
additional binding constraints, sometimes by intentionally delaying administrative 
procedures for locating and expanding industrial plants. This became a real threat, because 
firms lost profits during these lengthy procedural delays. 
On the other hand, local governments also became cooperative and even made quick 
environmental scans and audits free of charge, once firms were convinced to comply with 
the regulations. They conducted on-site inspections without prior notice, but did not 
immediately give out severe sanctions when they found violations. They began with cautions 
and then warnings, before issuing improvement orders. They distributed leaflets about 
manufacturers that produced suitable pollution-abatement technologies, and provided soft 
loans during the process of administrative guidance. Where plants were too small to make 
cost-effective pollution-abatement investments, they developed industrial estates equipped 
with joint treatment facilities and encouraged firms to relocate plants there. 
Firms were convinced to comply with these stringent measures and monitoring because 
these measures had a solid scientific basis that reduced uncertainty over regulations, 
pollution-abatement costs, and compensation, and that helped to avoid unnecessary 
government interventions. This sense of compliance, together with the strict monitoring and 
                                                 
1958. 
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administrative guidance of local governments, prevented the moral hazard of firms’ misuse 
of environmental soft loans (Mori, Lee and Ueta, 2005). 
Moreover, most people were satisfied with the paternalistic formulation and 
implementation of policies and measures, as long as they were able to see visible 
environmental improvement and publications such as annual reports that disclosed the state 
of pollution and the activities of local governments. 
 
3.4 Backlash 
Environmental activism continued, but most of the protest movements of the early 1970s 
disbanded once their grievances had been addressed. By the 1980s, the environmental 
movement had diminished in size and political influence while few pollution cases were 
brought to court.6 Not until the late 1980s and early 1990s did more than a few very small 
national environmental groups form. There were no independent environmental think tanks 
(Schreurs, 2002a). 
This drop in public attention weakened support for the Environmental Agency. Due to 
limited resources and authority, the Environmental Agency had to rely on MITI for the 
financial resources and information essential to formulate and implement environmental 
policies. This allowed the LDP, business, and MITI to resist further environmental 
regulations and even to scale back existing ones. These groups fiercely resisted legislation 
on environmental impact assessments (EIA), claiming it would hamper industrial location. 
This pressure made the Environmental Agency give up legislate EIA and adopted it by 
cabinet decision in 1984, but still had to compromise in excluding power plants from the 
target. These groups also applied strong pressure for the removal of the 1978 Pollution-
Related Health Damage Compensation Act, which, despite effecting substantial emissions 
reductions, required increasing amounts payable by firms, which was proportional to the 
growing number of victims. 
There are several factors that explain this diminution of support for environmental issues. 
First, the rapid and dramatic reduction of industrial pollution enhanced neo-corporatist 
formation in the process of environmental policy-making, allowed the government higher 
                                                 
6 One of the famous cases was the 1978 air pollution case in the Nishiyodogawa and 
Amagasaki areas, where the presence of industrial plants and vehicles driving on the 
highway and national roads had seriously damaged the health of nearby residents. The 
court found against the industrial plants and the highway corporation, and ordered them to 
pay compensation for joint outrage, but did not impose a suspension of operation. Both 
parties finally accepted mediation in 1998, agreeing to examine the regeneration of 
communities. 
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social control, and reduced social volunteerism in ordinary society. The LDP had responded 
actively to the environmental agenda of citizens’ movements at the national level. It had 
passed several pollution control legislations in 1970, and set up the Environmental Agency 
in 1971 to enhance institutions for pollution control. Recognizing that local governments 
had taken a lead in adopting stringent environmental regulations, it had legally allowed them 
to set more stringent standards and to expand the range of pollutants and types and/or size 
of plants under regulation. This transfer of authority turned problems into local matters. For 
example, most citizens identified anti-nuclear activities as being only a local issue, forgetting 
the fact that, collectively, more than 30 per cent of electricity consumption relied on nuclear 
power. 
The localization of problems prompted environmental movements to pursue local 
solutions instead of bringing cases to court or organizing nationwide movements. This 
reduced public attention. It also pushed the movements to change their orientation and goals 
toward local matters. Moreover, the core members of many movements were housewives 
who relied on their husband’s earnings, and their husbands often worked for the firms that 
were the sources of pollution. These women became conservative and dropped out of the 
anti-pollution movements when Japan entered a recession, as their activities in such 
movements raised the risk of adverse impacts on the salaries and promotions of their 
husbands. Some movements gave up the social nature of their protest and paid more attention 
to monitoring wildlife. Others turned their activities into consumer movements and 
organized consumer cooperatives. They had little incentive to organize umbrella 
organizations that supported nationwide movements, and each organization was strongly 
opposed to any intervention or guidance from outsiders. 
This change on the part of anti-pollution movements further empowered government and 
business to divide citizens’ environmental concerns piecemeal and to deal with problems 
separately at the local level. As people perceived visible improvements in air and water 
quality, the media paid less attention. Anti-pollution movements did not evolve into broader 
environmental movements that included amenity and nature. All of this enabled the LDP to 
reverse its electoral slide at the local level, while opposition parties lost the chance to pick 
up on environmental concerns as a way of expanding their support. 
Second, government and business deprived citizens’ movements of resources that could 
have attracted supporters. The process of obtaining the status of juridical person, which 
organizations required to rent offices, connect phone lines, and have bank accounts, was not 
totally transparent. Gaining tax-exempt status was also highly unpredictable, for it was 
necessary to obtain approval from the prefectural government that had jurisdiction over an 
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area. These procedures offered advantages to those entities that employed former high-
ranking government officers, while hampering the emergence of citizen-based non-profit 
organizations. 
In addition, the government often refused to widen the range of disclosure of public 
information. The government was less open to the idea of passing legislation that would 
have made decision-making more transparent or pluralistic, brought public and political 
attention to environmental threats, or developed and disseminated new ways of thinking and 
making policy on the environment. In order to strengthen their position in inter-ministerial 
negotiations and in policy formulation, bureaucrats often turned to advanced countries for 
information about new environmental problems, policy ideas, and policy instruments 
(Schreurs, 2002a: 332). The lack of information caused environmental movements to miss 
out on chances for raising awareness about environmental crises and for proposing 
alternatives to citizens. 
Third, local governments lost flexibility in fiscal expenditure, which deprived them of a 
fiscal basis for initiating innovative policies. As a means of restoring the balance between 
economic growth and social development and the environment, local governments increased 
expenditure for social services and the environment, and constructed sewage systems, waste 
landfill sites, and incineration plants. As most local governments, especially those with 
reformist governors or mayors, provided social services at a lower charge, they could rarely 
recover their operational costs. This increased operational, maintenance, and personnel 
expenditures that could not easily be reduced. Local governments rely for most of their 
revenue on corporate business and property taxes, both of which fluctuate with business 
cycles. They faced fiscal deficit when many companies reduced profits and paid less tax than 
expected. This deprived them of flexibility in fiscal expenditure, as seen by the rise of current 
balance ratios in Figure 1.1. This is especially true of the Osaka prefectural and municipal 
governments, which increased social and environmental expenditures to restore sound social 
and environmental conditions but did not obtain enough tax revenue during the depression 
period in the 1970s to compensate for these increases. 
The rise of current balance ratios forced local governments to increase their fiscal reliance 
on special purpose subsidies and debt for financing capital expenditure. As the central 
government strictly controlled debt issue, and allocated special purpose subsidies in 
accordance with its-initiated development plans, the LDP-led central government took 
advantage of the situation, showing a bias in favor of local governments that implemented 
central policies and supported LDP candidates in the election. In other words, to obtain 
subsidies, governors and mayors were required to have close connections with LDP 
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members of parliament and central ministries, and to obey central policy initiatives. This 
fiscal pressure allowed the LDP back to the decision-making table at the local level, and 
encouraged local elites to invite former high-ranking central ministry officers to stand as 
candidates for governor and mayor. 
The local governments that had LDP governors and mayors often responded positively to 
central government initiatives, such as the new Comprehensive National Development Plan, 
enacted in 1987, and the Law for Promoting the Development of High Technology Integrated 
Regions, enacted in 1983. They competed to attract high-tech and tourism industries as a 
means of boosting local economic growth. This attitude, coupled with failure to legislate the 
EIA, the deregulation of land use, and the rolling back of nature protection regulations, 
allowed local governments to ignore complaints from local people and adverse impacts to 
the environment and community. 
 
4. Administrative Failure and Resurging Movements for Democratic Institutions 
4.1 Criticism over Government-led Development Projects 
Comprehensive development plans caused local governments to suffer from serious fiscal 
deficits and to lose their fiscal independence (Figure 1.1). With central subsidies and bond 
issues under the comprehensive national development plan in the 1980s, local governments 
invested in land and infrastructure development in advance to attract business. However, 
many of them failed to attract business because the appreciation of Japanese currency and 
trade liberalization in many East Asian countries offered more profitable investment 
opportunities to Japanese businesses in East Asia. When the bubble burst and land prices 
collapsed in the early 1990s, local governments were faced with huge amounts of debt and 
were forced to cut their current, not to mention their capital, expenditures significantly. Even 
those that succeeded in inviting high-tech industrial plants and/or tourism business were 
required to provide additional expenditure to control and reverse the adverse impacts of the 
resulting pollution, which included groundwater and soil contamination and the loss of forest, 
watershed, and natural amenity. The pollution in turn meant that tourism faced decreased 
demand. Some local governments were forced to bail out the businesses that they had tried 
so hard to attract. 
Even after the failure of the fourth comprehensive development plan became apparent, 
the LDP government increased subsidies for public works at a local level. These subsidies 
were a part of fiscal stimulus packages, but the LDP government implemented them as the 
easiest way to create jobs at the local construction sector and thus to win elections. Public 
works offered jobs to farmers in winter, when they could obtain no agricultural income and 
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forced to go to urban areas as temporary workers. The local construction sector became a 
vested interest and required the LDP to increase industry jobs in exchange for political 
support. In response, LDP members of parliament exerted their influence on the Ministry of 
Construction (MoC) and Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) to increase public works in their 
constituencies. Their requests supported both ministries to make ambitious infrastructure 
development plans and to obtain increased budgets for public works. To increase local 
acceptance, the government abandoned the “beneficiary pays” principle to reduce charges 
to beneficiaries (Igarashi and Ogawa, 2001). As such, an “iron” triangle between the 
construction industry, the LDP, and the ministries was established (Hirose, 1981). This 
triangle was used to provide jobs in construction sectors to the laborers who were made 
redundant by the shutdown and elimination of manufacturing companies in the 1990s. 
In addition, the ministries, together with the LDP, made decisions on long-term plans, 
projects, and budget allocation without involving the people affected (Igarashi and Ogawa, 
2008). Neither ministry had any intention of even modifying the design of some projects that 
had been planned several decades earlier, when economic and social demands were urgently 
high. Local governments ignored the adverse impacts of these projects on the environment 
and local society in order to obtain subsidies and/or not to return the subsidies that had 
already obtained and spent to the projects. 
However, this fiscal stimulus further increased the fiscal dependency of local 
governments. Construction became the major industry in many local areas. Local 
governments were forced to obtain central subsidies to keep jobs in the construction sector, 
even if they recognized that the subsidized public works were not urgent to local 
development. Local governments had little incentive to stop public works because of adverse 
impacts on the environment. In addition, these works increased fiscal deficits and reduced 
fiscal flexibility because they required cost sharing with local governments in the name of 
the “beneficiary pays” principle. Many local governments resorted to bond issues, which 
were repaid by offsetting against block grants. 
This attitude, alongside the worsening fiscal deficit, sparked massive citizen protests 
against public works. Citizen protests caused some projects to be suspended, as seen in the 
reclamation project at Lake Shinji. Some cities went further, requiring local referenda to fill 
the gap between local councils and mayors and public opinion on development projects. 
Local referenda were called in the 1990s to block development of nuclear power plants, 
dams, waste incineration plants, and disposal sites (Niigata Nippo, 1997). 
In response, the Environmental Agency finally enacted the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act in 1997, albeit with strong pressure from MITI and the electric power 
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industry to exclude power generation. In 2000, the Agency also enacted the Basic Act on 
Establishing a Sound Material-Cycle Society, to mitigate conflicts over waste incineration 
plants and disposal sites. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced 
a comprehensive study to review energy policy, and enacted the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) Act in 2003. 
This new legislation, nonetheless, did not change the economic and institutional structure 
that caused the problems. Pressure from the electric power industry, which became stronger 
with the deregulation of the electricity market, forced MITI to give up promoting renewable 
energy as an alternative to nuclear power and instead to adopt a quota system with a very 
limited amount of mandated purchase of renewable power (0.65 per cent in 2007 and 1.6 per 
cent in 2014). It made the Ministry of Environment to give up including power plants in the 
Strategic Environmental Assessment Bill that was submitted in the Parliament in 2009 and 
2010 under the Japan Democratic Party (JDP) government7. The Basic Act on Establishing 
a Sound Material-Cycle Society has significantly increased the recycling rate and brought 
change in the design of products and packages, but it is criticized as leaving the structure of 
massive production and massive consumption unchanged, and simply adding massive 
recycling to the problem. 
 
4.2 Information Disclosure 
Under coalition governments between 1993 and 1996, the inappropriate spending and 
decisions by government were disclosed to the public. Typical examples were of the wining 
and dining of bureaucrats to influence government expenditure, the bailout of government 
housing loan companies, and even HIV-infected blood products. As many prefectural 
governments and municipalities increased their reliance on subsidies from the central 
government, and as competition over the subsidies became fierce, they increased spending 
for the entertainment of central government bureaucrats to try and tip the balance in their 
favor. Citizen networks took advantage of local ordinances on the disclosure of public 
information to uncover this spending. This created a storm of criticism over bureaucrats’ use 
of tax monies for their personal entertainment. 
Also, the Ministry of Finance was blamed for concealing information on the financial 
status of the government housing loan companies when proposing bailouts. Citizens as well 
as business leaders strongly opposed the injection of government funds, for they knew the 
financial corporations involved had paid higher salaries than other industries and had 
                                                 
7 The Environmental Agency was upgraded to be the Ministry in the bureaucratic 
reorganization in 2000. 
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speculated on land. However, the ministry hid documents and memos that showed the 
process of decision-making and did not admit any fault over its decisions or administration. 
In the case of HIV-infected blood products, the Ministry of Health and Welfare was 
accused of forbearance since it had obtained knowledge on the health risks of the use of such 
products through surveys in Japan and foreign countries, but did not dare to stop their 
production and consumption owing to concerns about the profits of domestic manufacturers. 
It was therefore blamed for causing serious health damage or death to a number of people. 
The minister involved apologized and decided to pay compensation to a number of victims, 
but the ministry did not admit fault and refused to pay compensation to those who were 
certified as victims later on. Victims brought their cases to court to clarify the guilt of both 
manufacturers and the ministry, and finally won judgments in their favor. 
During the same period, serious groundwater and soil contamination was uncovered near 
electric and electronics manufacturing plants, as well as near condominiums and parks where 
industrial plants had been located in the past. In these cases, however, local governments 
were reluctant to investigate or reveal sources, and thus most of the details about the 
contaminations have not yet been fully made public (Yoshida, 2002). Some firms paid part 
of the cleanup costs but refused to admit fault. 
These factors caused the government to lose credibility and fueled criticism against it. 
The government was forced to enact the Public Information Disclosure Act, which mandated 
the government to disclose information through public documents, including documents of 
the private sector that the government had obtained during its administration, and documents 
that recorded decision-making processes. It limited the range of information that may be 
kept secret. The Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR) Act was also enacted in 
order for citizens to access information on firms’ release and transfer of designated pollutants, 
especially volatile organic compounds (VOCs). 
This disclosure legislation impacted the government and private sector. Members of the 
ministerial council could not speak out for fear of being criticized as “rent-seekers” or 
proponents of specific interest groups, and firms were forced to invest in the proper 
management of chemicals at their plants in order to avoid fierce local protests. 
Yet some bureaucrats resisted the public information disclosure so strongly that the 
legislation was enacted only in 2001, a full six years from when the public debate had been 
launched. In addition, provisions thought to be essential for citizens to take advantage of the 
Act—the right to know, introduction of in-camera review, and the range of disclosed 
information-- were not clearly stipulated or excluded (Asaoka, 1997). Furthermore, the 
release and transfer of toxic substances were to be disclosed only at prefectural level, not at 
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plant level. Courts have also often made unfavorable judgments over disclosure. Together, 
these factors have limited the people’s right to know and thus the empowerment of civil 
society. 
 
4.3 Comprehensive Administrative and Fiscal Reform 
In response to strong local protests over public works, deteriorating fiscal situations, and 
the accumulating sub-performing loans at government banks, the LDP coalition government 
initiated comprehensive administrative reform in 1996. Initially it aimed to reorganize 
bureaucratic structures to separate implementation functions into independent administrative 
agencies. It became apparent, however, as the financial status of and subsidies to special 
government corporations were disclosed, that the national investment and loan program was 
at the root of the problems. This program was instituted to finance capital expenditure in a 
special account when the government cut spending in the general budget account, and 
required a variety of subsidies from the general budget to compensate for the loss. 
Thus the reform centered on the privatization of the postal system that provided savings 
to this program, and forced special government corporations, such as the Japan Highway 
Public Corporation, to issue bonds to finance their business. However, most of these bonds 
are government-guaranteed, and special corporations continue to obtain subsidies for interest 
payments. Thus these reforms are expected to produce little improvement, if any, in the 
financial prudence of these corporations (Shindou, 2006). 
The coalition government also enacted the Decentralization Package Act in 2000 to 
enhance innovation in administration so that local governments could manage local 
problems in their jurisdiction. The Act stipulated that the central government should abandon 
the unilateral imposition of administrative jobs without legislation, described the devolution 
of legislative authorities, and allowed local governments to increase non-statute earmarked 
taxes upon taxpayers’ consent. 
However, this Act created no political space for local governments to make new 
ordinances. It allowed new ordinances only in compliance with the law, implying that the 
central bureaucrats would keep control. The Ministry of Finance transferred some sources 
of fiscal revenue, but at the same time reduced block grants in amounts that more than offset 
the transferred revenue (Takahashi, 2009). Many prefectural governments adopted 
environment-related earmarked taxes such as the industrial waste tax, watershed tax, and 
forest protection tax, but the amount collected through these taxes is minuscule (less than 
one per cent of total revenue). This discouraged local governments from increasing local 
autonomy and accountability to citizens. 
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5. Impacts of Globalization 
5.1 Greening of the Neo-corporatist Regime 
In response to the international criticism over environmentally destructive activities and 
to the international demand for greener products, Japanese industries have changed their 
production process, obtained International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 
certifications, and published annual environmental reports with environmental accounting 
to show their performance and progress in this area to stakeholders. In order to keep trade 
with firms located in the European Union (EU), many Japanese firms paid non-tangible costs 
to obtain the ISO 14001 certification. They set up environmental offices to describe their 
environmental practices in documents that were shared and delivered along the production 
line, and required subcontractors to obtain certifications with the threat of stopping 
transactions. In the process, some firms established green supply chains to substantially 
reduce environmental impacts throughout the life cycle of their products (Mori, 2002). In 
the same vein, the EU Directives on Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS) and the 
EU Regulations on Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH) pressured manufacturers on substituting raw materials and changing production 
processes and thus created private institutions for environmental protection. 
Globalization has had an impact on environmental policy in Japan. To avoid criticism 
over mounting trade surpluses and to enhance its influence in the international community, 
the LDP (or at least its influential faction) took a lead in advancing environmental policies. 
It initiated the provision of official development assistance (ODA) for environmental 
protection in developing countries, and supported the enactment of the Basic Environmental 
Act in Japan as a response to the United National Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). Even after the influence of this faction waned, a new crop of green 
politicians emerged both in ruling and opposing parties. Among them was GLOBE, an inter-
parliamentary group that facilitated international cooperation on the environment. 
However, the bureaucracy lagged behind the rise of environmental concerns in the 
international community. In the 1990s, it restructured to establish new offices, increased its 
resources, reoriented the research agenda, and established new research institutions, but its 
motivation was to avoid undesirable conclusions in multilateral environmental negotiations. 
Nonetheless, there remains a severe conflict of interest between MITI and the Environmental 
Agency that may be characterized as business interests against regulation. This has created 
a barrier to advancing environmental policies in fields where business has strongly opposed 
it. 
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This limited and reactive response can be seen as a consequence of the long-term 
monopolistic rule of the LDP, as well as of a shortage of resources allocated for these issues 
by the bureaucracy. Lack of competition among parties has made it difficult for the ruling 
party to get massive support to initiate policy changes, to control bureaucrats, and to keep 
discipline within the party. Instead, LDP members of parliaments intensified pressure to 
reflect local needs of their constituency on policies and budget allocation at the central 
ministries. A fragmented bureaucratic policy network with business associations and 
academic researchers has exacerbated this lack of clear policy initiative (Iio, 2007). Under 
this interrelationship, both the ruling party and ministries have little if any incentive to make 
policies that are not in favor of their vested interests. 
 
5.2 Resurgence of Environmental Movements 
As a result of UNCED, the international normative expectation on the increased role of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has created an increasing dilemma for Japanese 
government and business (Schreurs, 2002b: 224). Officials have been trying to figure out 
how they can work with NGOs to increase their size and status, while at the same time not 
yet fully appreciating environmental groups’ potential role in policy-making and 
implementation. 
There is a stronger internal driving force for the government to work with NGOs. 
Volunteers had a visible role in the post-earthquake activities in the Kobe area, which 
highlighted the delays and deficiencies of the government. The government and business 
have slowly started to accept NGOs as legitimate actors in the policy-making process and to 
recognize the role they can play in society in bringing attention to issues and helping to 
implement policy solutions. 
These external and internal driving forces led to the enactment of the Non-Profit 
Organization (NPO) Law in 1998. It made it easier for groups to obtain non-profit status and 
thus help to empower civil society. At the same time, groups were required to be more 
accountable to their members. 
Despite this law, however, it is still difficult for private organizations to achieve legal 
status as NPOs and to obtain sufficient financial resources to hire full-time staff. Most of 
them are trapped in a trade-off between donations and accountability, where small 
membership and donations restrict NGOs’ ability to hire full-time staff, while lack of staff 
makes it difficult to be accountable to members. This, in cyclical fashion, lowers their 
credibility and leads to smaller membership and donations. There are no major private 
foundations to provide resources to environmental groups and think tanks, and few 
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foundations allow environmental groups to spend their money on hiring staff. They have to 
rely for their financial resources on grants-in-aid for projects. As a result, environmental 
movements at the national level remain extremely small and weak. Environmental policy 
formulation remains more or less exclusively in the hands of bureaucrats and industry. 
Nonetheless, the number of NGOs involved in international environmental protection has 
grown as the public interest in the global environment increases. The environmental NGO 
community has worked to strengthen its voice in the decision-making process since the late 
1980s (Schreurs, 2002b: 219). To do this, they have organized umbrella NGOs and network-
based NGOs and enhanced their capacity as advocacy think tanks. They have started to hold 
seminars and events, while still respecting the independence of each individual NGO. 
In the 1990s, several Asia-focused environmental networks emerged to criticize Japanese 
environmental destruction through international trade, foreign direct investment, and ODA. 
These networks were at first adversarial to the government, but gradually started to influence 
it in instituting environmental and social safeguards, as aid agencies and export credit 
institutions started to hold periodic deliberative meetings with NGOs. The topics, however, 
increasingly became too specialized to attract wider attention from the public. 
 
5.3 Can Climate Change Be of General Interest? 
Climate change is gaining wider public attention and can be said to be of general interest 
because of the moral issue of intergenerational equity. Climate change negotiations 
succeeded in bringing NGOs and citizens’ organizations together. Promotion of renewable 
energy as a means of climate change mitigation succeeded in forming an alliance between 
politicians (Schreurs, 2002b: 220–1). NGOs have held seminars to facilitate discussion and 
share common interests between government, business, researchers, and citizens. 
Nonetheless, the government has taken little more than a voluntary approach, with fiscal 
stimulus for purchasing low-carbon goods and houses. It has yet to adopt economic 
instruments such as a carbon tax or emissions trading, although it did launch a pilot 
emissions trading program among voluntarily participating firms. It adopted feed-in tariffs, 
but they applied only to the small amount of solar power that consumers generate for their 
domestic use. This showed a compromise between fostering the photovoltaic manufacturing 
industry and protecting the vested interests of existing power companies. In 2009, the Japan 
Democratic Party took over the government and declared a 25 per cent reduction of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the UN Special Conference on Climate Change, and 
brought in the Global Warming Bill in 2010. However, it remains uncertain whether this 
political change will alter the balance in favor of climate policy, empowerment of civil 
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society, and enhancement of initiatives and solutions of local governments, given the strong 
opposition of business society and concern over adverse impact on international 
competitiveness of industries. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This chapter examined the historical development of environmental policy and 
governance in Japan, with special focus on the interaction between the LDP and the central 
government on the one hand, and environmental movements and local government 
initiatives on the other hand. The main findings were as follows. Firstly, democratic 
institutions that had been established since the 1870s, as well as 1947 Constitution created 
legal basis for anti-pollution movements. Constitutional democracy, together with civic 
rights and freedoms, enabled victims to make protests relatively safely and media to 
publicize issues nationwide. Access to justice enabled courts to make judgments in favor of 
victims in situations where industrial pollution endangered the fairness of society and further 
economic growth. 
Secondly, institutions for the environment were largely top-down, centralized, and 
hierarchical because the central government did not change its development-oriented 
strategy and kept its consensual relationships with business. Even under this unaccountable, 
less pluralistic regime, a highly technologically oriented approach succeeded in pollution 
reduction and regained support for the LDP. However, this success deprived local 
governments of political space to take further initiatives and blocked the development of 
institutions for civil society. 
Thirdly, increased fiscal revenue was the financial basis for local governments to take the 
initiative in industrial pollution control. When faced with fiscal deficits, however, they had 
to rely on central special purpose subsidies, and bond issues in financing their expenditure. 
This brought them into competition over subsidies and directed them to implement the 
policies and initiatives of the central government, and lost political space and incentive to 
initiate policies outside those of the central government. 
Fourthly, the uncover of a lack of government capacity, as well as globalization of 
environmental problems in the 1990s raised citizens’ interest in non-profit activities and 
access to information, and prompted citizens’ involvement in the environmental policy 
network. 
Finally, despite the resurgence of environmental movements and step-down of the LDP-
lead governments, greening policies has been limited to what business society can 
compromise and respond to them by technical measures. This implies that changes of 
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government are not sufficient to advance environmental policy. A More accountable 
institution should be established. 
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Figure 1.1 Current Balance Ratio of Prefectural Governments and Municipalities 
 
Note 1: Fiscal structure is evaluated as becoming inflexible when the ratio exceeds 80, and 
to have become inflexible enough to initiate any activity when it exceeds 100. 
Note 2: It was uncovered that the Osaka Prefectural Government reported window-dressed 
accounts during 2004–6 in order to avoid the direct intervention of central government 
(Asahi Shinbun, 30 December 2007). Thus the stated ratio during these three years is 
smaller than the actual realized ratio. 
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Statement of Accounts of Prefectural Governments 
(yearly) and Statement of Accounts of Municipalities (yearly). 
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